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Running title: evolution of “all or nothing” signalling 24 
 25 
Abstract 26 
Many models of honest signalling, based on Zahavi’s handicap principle, predict that 27 
if receivers are interested in a quality that shows continuous variation across the 28 
population of signallers, then the distribution of signal intensities will also be 29 
continuous. However, it has previously been noted that this prediction does not agree 30 
with empirical observation in many signalling systems, where signals are limited to a 31 
small number of levels despite continuous variation in the trait being signalled. 32 
Typically, there is a critical value of the trait, with all individuals with trait values on 33 
one side of the threshold using the same cheap signal, and all those with trait values 34 
on the other side of the threshold using the same expensive signal. It has already been 35 
demonstrated that these classical models naturally predict such “all-or-nothing 36 
signalling” if it is additionally assumed that receivers suffer from perceptual error in 37 
evaluating signal strength. We show that such all-or-nothing signalling is also 38 
predicted if receivers are limited to responding to the signals in one of two ways. We 39 
suggest that many ecological situations (such as the decision to attack the signaller or 40 
not, or mate with the signaller or not) involve such binary choices.   41 
 42 
Keywords: signaling, signal honesty, Zahavi’s handicap principle, communication, 43 
cost of signalling 44 
45 
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Introduction 46 
Game theoretical models based on Zahavi’s handicap principle have been very 47 
influential in offering an explanation for how signalling can remain (on average) 48 
honest when there is conflict of interest between signaller and receiver (Maynard 49 
Smith & Harper 2003; Searcy & Nowicki 2005) . Johnstone (1994) raised an 50 
interesting comparison between the predictions of still-influential models and 51 
empirical observation. Models generally predict that the intensity of the signal will 52 
vary continuously in relation to the quantity being signalled. For example, in a 53 
situation where potential prey individuals vary continuously in the strength of their 54 
chemical defences, these models would predict a similar continuous distribution of 55 
warning signal intensities to potential predators. To express this another way, these 56 
models predict that the signals should provide exact quantitative information about the 57 
specific defensive capability of each signaller. In contrast, Johnstone (1994) provides 58 
numerous empirical examples of signals where observed variation in signal strength is 59 
much less: being confined to a small number (often two) of discrete signal strengths. 60 
In the context of our example above, this would suggest that even if there is strong 61 
and continuously-distributed between-individual variation in the strength of the 62 
defences being signalled, the potential prey only adopt one of two signal intensities. 63 
All those individuals with defence levels below some threshold value produce 64 
essentially identical signals of the same low intensity; all those with defence values 65 
above the threshold signal at the same characteristic high intensity. In comparison to 66 
the model predictions then, real signals often seem less quantitatively informative. 67 
They inform the receiver not about the specific quality of an individual signaller but 68 
only about the range of qualities (either above or below the threshold in the example 69 
above) in which the individual falls.  70 
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 Johnstone (1994) not only drew attention to this apparent tension between 71 
model predictions and empirical observations, he also offered a plausible solution. He 72 
demonstrated that previous models had assumed that the receiver identifies the 73 
intensity of the signal with perfect fidelity. If, however, perceptual errors are 74 
introduced into these models, such that the receiver can make errors in their 75 
evaluation of the signal intensity, then the predictions of the models change to being 76 
much more in line with the “all or nothing” displays often seen in nature. Such 77 
perceptual errors are very plausible (Dusenbury 1992; Hailman 2008). 78 
 Here we make no criticism of Johnstone’s (or any other previous) work but 79 
present another modification to previous models which we argue is biologically 80 
realistic, very widely applicable and again leads to a prediction of “all of nothing” 81 
displays even when no perceptual errors are assumed in the model. Essentially our 82 
key modification rests in the evaluation of optimal predator behaviour. Like previous 83 
works, Johnstone assumed that the optimal strategy for the receiver was that which 84 
minimized the least-square estimate of signaller quality for each perceived advertising 85 
level. That is, the receiver is expected to be selected to evaluate the underlying quality 86 
of all individuals as accurately as possible, and all deviations from accurate estimation 87 
are in some way costly to the receiver. We suggest that there are many biological 88 
situations where the challenge facing the receiver is less strict and some mis-89 
evaluations produce no fitness cost.  90 
 Consider again the predator that encounters individuals from a prey population 91 
that vary continuously in their level of chemical defence. On encountering a potential 92 
prey individual, the predator must make a binary decision: to eat the individual or not. 93 
If the predator somehow had complete and perfect knowledge of the level of chemical 94 
defence in each prey individual then the most rational strategy is to identify the 95 
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minimum level of defence that makes a prey individual unattractive, then eat all 96 
individuals with levels below this threshold and reject all those with levels above it 97 
(Skelhorn & Rowe 2007). The problem for most real predators is that they do not 98 
have this perfect knowledge, rather they must make their decisions based on each 99 
individual’s level of signalling (Mappes et al 2005). Let us imagine that the level of 100 
defence can vary between zero and one and the threshold value discussed above is 101 
denoted by T. The challenge facing the predator is not to evaluate the defence level of 102 
each encountered individual as accurately as possible, but rather to make as few 103 
misclassifications as possible as it attempts to classify each individual as having a 104 
defence level either above or below T. Another way to look at this is that (unlike the 105 
formulation of Johnstone 1994 and other models) not all mistakes in the estimation of 106 
a prey individual’s level of defense incur fitness costs for the predator. If the true level 107 
of defence is D and the predator estimates the defence as a different value d, then this 108 
error only has fitness consequences for the predator (it only changes its behaviour) if 109 
D and d bracket the threshold value T, otherwise the inaccuracy of estimation has no 110 
effect. Further, it may be that the cost of a misclassification to the predator depends 111 
upon the value of D, but the value of d has no effect on the size of this cost, except in 112 
influencing whether or not misclassification occurs (and thus whether or not the cost 113 
is paid). Thus, we suggest that models where receivers can only produce a discrete 114 
number of responses to the signal might reasonably involve the assumption that 115 
fitness is affected not by accurate estimation of the qualitative value of the underlying 116 
quality of signallers, but by the less onerous task of correctly classifying prey into a 117 
number of distinct categories. We expect that this situation will occur commonly, 118 
where a receiver must make a simple binary choice (e.g. to attack or not, to mate or 119 
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not, to abandon a nest or not). Here we will explore the consequences of this change 120 
of fitness function for model predictions.  121 
 122 
 123 
Model description  124 
For ease of comparison we have attempted to keep our model definition and structure 125 
as close to that of Johnstone (1994) as possible. 126 
 127 
We suppose that signallers vary in some quantity that is of interest to receivers, but 128 
which they cannot directly observe. We denote the value of this quantity held by a 129 
specific individual as q (for quality). Signallers can vary in the intensity of some 130 
signal that can be directly observed by receivers, with the signal given by a specific 131 
individual being denoted a (for advertising). We denote the function A(q) as the 132 
signalling strategy, which specifies the signal intensity (the value of a) given by 133 
individuals of different qualities (different values of q).  134 
 135 
On receipt of the signal from a specific signaller, the receiver can act in one of only 136 
two distinct ways (we denote these alternatives “choice 0” and “choice 1”). The 137 
receiver strategy is described by g(a), which is the probability of making choice 1 on 138 
receipt of a signal of intensity a. By definition, an individual which does not make 139 
choice 1 must make choice 0, and vice versa. Unlike Johnstone (1994), we assume 140 
perfect fidelity of signal transmission, so if the signaller sends a value a, the receiver 141 
receives exactly that same value.  142 
 143 
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The reward U that a signaller gets from an interaction with the receiver depends on its 144 
quality q, the signal strength it used a, and the response of the receiver (either 0 or 1).  145 
Thus the reward to the signaller is U(a,i,q), where i is the response of the receiver: i 146 
{0,1}.  147 
 148 
We assume that choice 1 by the receiver is always more beneficial to the signaller 149 
than choice 0. That is U(a,0,q) < U(a,1,q) for all combinations of a and q values. Thus 150 
in our previous example, choice 1 is rejection of the signalling prey by the predator. 151 
We also assume that the advantage of choice 1 over choice 0 to the receiver does not 152 
decrease with q, i.e.   153 
 154 
.0),0,,1,(
q
qaUqaU
                                                                           (1) 155 
For example, a high-quality male will have at least as large a gain from mating over 156 
not mating as a lower-quality male. This seems generally likely to be true for mating 157 
systems. For our predator-prey example, the difference between choice 1 and choice 0 158 
is between persuading the predator not to attack versus being attacked.  In this case, 159 
condition (1) means that even very highly defended prey benefit from persuading the 160 
predator not to attack at least as much as weakly defended prey do. Whilst it may be 161 
that very highly defended prey can survive attacks because the predator discovers the 162 
level of defence during the attack and thus aborts the attack, even such abortive 163 
attacks can be costly to prey in terms of risk of injury and/or time and energy wasted. 164 
Further, in some situations the predator may have already killed the prey before 165 
aborting the attack when realizing that the particular prey item is too defended to be 166 
eaten. Thus condition (1) seems plausible in a predator-prey context too.  167 
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 168 
We further assume that signals are expensive to the signaller, and that this expense 169 
increases (and so the net reward from an interaction decreases) with increasing 170 
signalling intensity. Thus we assume that for all combinations of (a,i,q), 171 
 172 
.0,,
a
qiaU
                                                                                                (2) 173 
We also assume that the cost of higher signal intensity is proportionately greater for a 174 
lower quality individual: 175 
 176 
.0,,
2
aq
qiaU
                                                                                               (3) 177 
These assumptions about the costs of signalling are those generally considered as 178 
requirements for honest signalling via the handicap model (Grafen 1990, Bradbury & 179 
Vehrencamp 1998, Searcy & Nowak 2005; but see Lachman et al 2001 for an 180 
exception).   181 
 182 
The reward to a signaller of quality q that signals with intensity a is given by  183 
 184 
qaUagqaUagaSq ,0,1,1,      (4) 185 
 186 
We assume that there is only a single type of receiver in our model, so that for 187 
instance receivers do not vary in quality and hence in their reward functions. We also  188 
assume the reward to the receiver from an encounter is a function of the quality of the 189 
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signaller q and the receiver’s decision i, which we shall denote by V(q,i), and that the 190 
higher the quality of the signaller (the higher q is) the better it is for the receiver to 191 
make choice 1. That is V(q,1) – V(q,0) increases with q. In our example, the more 192 
defended the prey individual the more advantageous it is for the predator to reject the 193 
opportunity to eat it.  194 
 195 
Let f(q) describe the frequency distribution of signallers of different qualities in the 196 
local population (which the receiver encounters randomly). The expected receiver 197 
reward is a function of its strategy (g) and is given by 198 
 199 
dqqAgqVqVqfdqqVqf
dqqAgqVqfdqqAgqVqfgR
0,1,0,
1,10,
                          (5) 200 
 201 
where integrals are evaluated over all possible values of signaller quality. We shall 202 
assume that in the absence of any signal the receiver will always make choice 0 (e.g. 203 
predators must always attack some prey to survive, so in the absence of a signal they 204 
will attack all prey rather than none), i.e. 205 
 206 
dqqVqfdqqVqf 1,0,                                                                        (6) 207 
 208 
Model evaluation  209 
We know that V(q,1) – V(q,0) increases with q; let us suppose in particular that  210 
V(q,1) – V(q,0) < 0 if and only if the quality of the signaller is below some critical 211 
value qcrit, so we have 212 
 213 
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1,0, critcrit qVqV .        (7) 214 
 215 
Thus the receiver would benefit from making choice 0 if and only if q< qcrit.  216 
 217 
Any strategy of the receiver must specify how it responds to every possible signal. 218 
Denote the set of all signals a for which the receiver actually makes choice 1 as A1, 219 
and the set of all signals for which the receiver makes choice 0 as Ao. A1 and A0 are 220 
disjoint sets (no possible signal appears in both sets), and all possible signals are a 221 
member of either A0 or A1.  222 
 223 
Since receivers respond to all signals in A1 identically, but signals are increasingly 224 
costly (inequality (2)) to senders as signal intensity increases, the only rational signal 225 
in the set A1 for a signaller to give is the lowest intensity (cheapest) signal in that set: 226 
which we denote min(A1). Similarly since receivers respond to all signals in A0 227 
identically, but signals are increasingly costly to senders as signal intensity increases, 228 
the only rational signal in the set Ao for a signaller to give is the lowest intensity 229 
(cheapest) signal in that set: which we denote min(Ao). 230 
 231 
Since U(a,0,q) < U(a,1,q) for all combinations of a and q values, for min(A0) to be 232 
optimal for any q, this implies that min(A0) < min(A1); that is that the signal associated 233 
with the less favourable receiver choice 0 must be of lower cost, and so at a lower 234 
intensity, than that associated with the more favourable choice 1. Since all possible 235 
signals are in either A0 or A1, the signal associated with 0 will be the cheapest signal 236 
of all the possible signals that are open to those individuals (A1 A0). Thus if the 237 
lowest cost signal is a = 0, then min(A0) = 0. Let us further define a1 min(A1). 238 
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Clearly a1 must be greater than zero. Thus there are at most two distinct signals in any 239 
evolutionarily stable signalling system. A necessary qualification at this point is that 240 
this is only true when receivers do not vary in quality to a sufficient degree that 241 
different receivers would ideally like to respond to many different signallers in 242 
different ways. If there is wide receiver variation, our results would no longer be 243 
valid. For instance Johnstone & Grafen (1992) consider the Sir Philip Sidney game 244 
where the choice to receivers is to donate food to a relative or not. All receivers 245 
survive if they do not donate (and all signallers survive if they receive a donation), but 246 
some receivers (signallers) are almost guaranteed to survive if they donate (do not 247 
receive), and others are almost guaranteed to die. Under such circumstances, 248 
assuming high relatedness, different receivers would “want” to make different 249 
decisions to a wide range of signallers (equivalent to having very different values of 250 
qcrit in our model), and consequently their model has a continuous signalling solution.   251 
 252 
It should be noted that our argument about the number of distinct signals generalizes 253 
to a system where the receiver has any finite number of decisions n.  If we denoted the 254 
set of all signals for which the receiver would respond with choice i by Ai, then the 255 
only potentially consistent signal choices by the signallers would be min(Ai), and so 256 
the maximum number of distinct signals would be n.  257 
 258 
Now let us suppose that we have an “honest” signal, namely one that distinguishes the 259 
signallers for which the receiver would want to make choice 0, from those for which 260 
choice 1 would be best. This would yield  261 
 262 
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0
1
,0
,1
Aaqq
Aaqq
qAg
crit
crit
                                                                  (8) 263 
 264 
When the receiver plays this strategy then the reward to the signaller simplifies to 265 
 266 
crit
crit
q qqAaqaU
qqAaqaU
aS
1
0
,1,
,0,
                                                          (9) 267 
 268 
Thus the optimal signalling strategy associated with an honest signal should be 269 
 270 
crit
crit
qqaA
qqA
qA
,0min
,0min
11
0
                                                               (10) 271 
 272 
For there to be a stable signalling strategy where all q < qcrit individuals pick 0 and all 273 
q > qcrit individuals pick a1, for some positive a1, we need both choices to offer the 274 
same reward to the signaller when q = qcrit  (otherwise individuals of quality either just 275 
above or below qcrit could do better by switching signal). Thus we need 276 
 277 
),0,0(,1,1 critcrit qUqaU .       (11) 278 
 279 
Since U( a1,1,q) decreases with increasing a1, there is at most one value of a1 that 280 
satisfies (11). Such a value will exist provided there is such a critical quality value qcrit 281 
where the receiver would want to change their strategy, and that the largest signals are 282 
sufficiently costly, so that U( ∞,1, qcrit)<U(0,0, qcrit). Thus [0, a1) A0 and a1  A1. In 283 
fact we shall assume the natural solution of A0 = [0, a1) and A1 = [a1, ). 284 
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 285 
Inequalities (1) and (2) ensure that for lower quality individuals the relative costs of 286 
signalling compared to the benefits of receiving choice 1 are higher, and consequently 287 
any individual of quality q < qcrit would do worse by changing its signal to a1 or any 288 
other value in A1, and any individual of quality q > qcrit would also do worse by 289 
switching signal. Note that the combination of (1) and (2) are sufficient but not 290 
necessary, so that the relative costs compared to benefits may decrease with quality 291 
even if only one of the two conditions hold.   292 
 293 
Note that the exact composition of the sets A0 and A1 in such a system depends upon 294 
how rogue signals not equal to 0 or a1 come about. Any individual that uses such a 295 
signal is behaving sub-optimally, so we would expect such situations to be rare. The 296 
exact solution in these rare cases would depend upon assumptions about the 297 
underlying causes of such irrational behaviour (see Discussion).  298 
 299 
It should also be noted that only two signals are used at equilibrium, and that if there 300 
are no rogue signals as described above, every receiver strategy that responds to these 301 
two signals in the same way thus performs equally well at the equilibrium, regardless 302 
of how they respond to other signals. We assume that there will be a low level of such 303 
“mistakes” which means that all receivers have to play optimally against the "non-304 
played" strategies themselves. This idea is often used in game theoretical modelling, 305 
and is known as the “trembling hand” (Selten, 1975). 306 
 307 
It is possible to envisage a signalling system that is not entirely honest. For stability 308 
all low-quality individuals must play 0, and all high quality individuals must play 309 
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min(A1); but perhaps there can be a cut-off point q* that is different to qcrit. If we 310 
replace qcrit by q* in (8-11), we would obtain a different equilibrium signalling system 311 
with a new level a*
 
for the higher signal. In the case where q*> qcrit, so that 312 
a*=min(A1)> a1, such a system could be destabilized by the introduction of a signaller 313 
that included a1  A1, which would enable individuals with qualities q*> q> qcrit to 314 
signal honestly to the benefit of themselves and the receiver. There will also be a 315 
value qmin so that if q*≤ qmin, (i.e. if q* is sufficiently small), then (due to inequality 6) 316 
the expected reward to the receiver will be at least as high if it changes to make choice 317 
0 against all signals, and so again the system is not stable. This leaves a family of 318 
possible “semi-honest” signalling systems with cutoff q* such that qmin < q*≤ qcrit that 319 
might be stable in some circumstances (when the “honest” solution also exists). Note 320 
that such alternative solutions are “semi-honest” in the sense that every individual 321 
giving the higher signal is of better quality than every individual giving the lower 322 
signal. However, some individuals with qualities near to (and on one side of) the 323 
critical value will gain advantage by using the “wrong” signal from the receiver’s 324 
viewpoint. Thus it is important to note that we do not claim that the fully honest signal 325 
is the one that the population will evolve to. We have shown, however, that such a 326 
system is a possible solution, and that all of the other potential solutions have the 327 
same all-or-nothing property.  328 
 329 
The general solution for our model is that signallers below a defined quality threshold 330 
all signal using the lowest-cost signal that is possible, and receivers respond to this 331 
signal with the choice that least benefits signallers; signals with quality above this 332 
threshold all signal using the same signal, this is a higher cost signal than that used by 333 
low-quality individuals and is the signal that leads to the same payoff to individuals of 334 
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the critical quality regardless of what the receivers do. Receivers respond to the 335 
higher-cost signal by adopting the behaviour (from a choice of two) that is more 336 
beneficial to signallers.  337 
 338 
Thus, although signallers vary continuously in quality, they do not show continuous 339 
variation in signal strength at this equilibrium. Rather, the discrete nature of the 340 
behavioural responses to signals available to the receiver causes the receiver to be 341 
interested in categorizing signallers rather than fully evaluating their quality, and this 342 
in turn leads to signalling being restricted to a number of discrete levels, less than or 343 
equal in number to the number of behavioural options open to the receiver.  344 
 345 
An example  346 
Let us consider a simple example where males of quality q signal to females, who can 347 
choose either to mate with a specific male or not.  348 
 349 
For the female, there is no reward (or cost) for declining to mate V(q,0) = 0. Mating 350 
requires a fixed cost ( ) and benefits increase linearly with the quality of the male. 351 
Thus, at its simplest V(q,1) = q – .  352 
 353 
For the male, there is a cost for an individual of quality q to produce a signal of 354 
strength a given by a/q. There is an additional payoff of unity if the female chooses to 355 
mate and zero otherwise. Thus,  356 
 357 
q
aqaU ,0, , 
q
aqaU 1,1, . 358 
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 359 
Substituting these into (7) and (11) yields the solution a1 = qcrit = .  360 
 361 
Thus under fully honest signalling we predict that males with quality lower than q =  362 
will signal using the lowest-cost signal available and will always be rejected by 363 
females; whereas males with a higher quality than this will signal at level  and will 364 
always be mated with by females.  365 
 366 
It is easy to see the rationality of this in the very simple case considered. At the 367 
equilibrium females always mate with males that offer a net benefit to them, and 368 
never mate with males that offer a net loss to them. Given this behaviour by receivers, 369 
the minimal-cost signalling of low quality males also seems easy to understand. Since 370 
these individuals are destined to be rejected by females, their signal can bring them no 371 
rewards and so the best strategy is to minimize the costs of signalling. However, 372 
investment in more expensive signalling is rational for the high quality individuals 373 
since they can convert this advertising into rewards (mating opportunities). Still they 374 
should be selected to invest just enough in advertising to both produce the desired 375 
behaviour in the receiver, and to prevent the best of the poor males from cheating. The 376 
payoff to low-quality, minimum-cost signallers is zero, the signal level adopted by the 377 
high-quality individuals is the cheapest signal that yields a net positive payoff to all 378 
individuals that use this signal (except any right on the threshold, who also receive 379 
zero).  380 
 381 
Discussion 382 
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In this paper we have considered a model of signalling behaviour where the receivers 383 
have only a discrete number of possible responses to the signal. Our model predicts 384 
that even if signallers vary continuously in quality, and signals are received with 385 
perfect fidelity, these signals need not show continuous variation in signal strength. 386 
Rather, the discrete nature of the behavioural responses to signals available to the 387 
receiver causes the receiver to be interested in categorizing signallers rather than fully 388 
evaluating their quality, and this in turn leads to signalling being restricted to a 389 
number of discrete levels (at most equal in number to the number of behavioural 390 
options open to the receiver). Thus we predict that such signals will be commonplace 391 
when the behavioural responses of receivers are constrained to take a discrete number 392 
of values. Examples of this could include signalling of prey toxicity to predators, 393 
where predators can respond either by eating an individual signaller or rejecting the 394 
opportunity to eat it. Another example may be mate choice where the choice is again 395 
binary: mating with or rejecting the signaller. We thus expect such situations and such 396 
all-or-nothing signalling to be commonplace. However, there are other cases where 397 
the responses of signal receivers may be more continuously distributed. For example, 398 
in response to signal quality of a long-term social partner, a female bird may vary the 399 
investment that she makes in the eggs that will become their joint-offspring (Clutton-400 
Brock 1991; Blount et al. 2000). This investment (say in levels of anti-oxidants 401 
committed to the eggs) is best seen as a continuously varying response, and so we 402 
would predict that the signalling behaviour of the males would not be well represented 403 
by the model considered here and (in the absence of perceptual errors) we would 404 
consider a continuously distributed signal by the males to be more likely.  405 
 Bergstrom & Lachman (1998) present a model that they use to suggest that 406 
honest signaling between relatives can be maintained in the absence of substantial 407 
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costs to signal production. The type of equilibrium that they consider are of the all-or-408 
nothing type discussed here, where signallers of a range of qualities are grouped into a 409 
finite number of what the authors term “pools”  with all individuals in the same pool 410 
producing the same signal. However, a very important difference between our 411 
approach and theirs is that a finite number of signal levels is a prediction of our 412 
model, whereas the signal being constrained such that only a finite number of signal 413 
types are possible is a fundamental assumption of their model. Our methodology does 414 
not involve any such constraint on signal production.    415 
The all-or-nothing signalling predicted here may not be seen in situations where there 416 
is strong between-individual variation in the receivers in the value of the signallers to 417 
them.  Consider the example of predators and chemically defended prey. Previously 418 
we have considered a critical value of toxins above which the prey becomes 419 
unattractive to the predators. There may be some circumstances where individual 420 
predators essentially agree on this critical value, in which case we would expect our 421 
model to hold. However, there may be other circumstances where there is 422 
considerable variation in this value between individual predators. This could be driven 423 
by variation between individuals in the need for the nutritional benefits of the prey 424 
(with hungrier individuals being prepared to accept higher toxin loads to avoid the 425 
risk of starvation) or variation in their ability to cope with the toxins (perhaps through 426 
variation in their current toxin burden): see Endler & Mappes (2004) for examples. If 427 
this variation in threshold of defence is large then this may cause the all-or-nothing 428 
type of signal predicted here to break down and be replaced by a more continuously-429 
varying signal, as in [10].  430 
 431 
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Johnstone (1994) cited a number of influential papers that predict (in contrast to our 432 
model) that signal intensity should vary continuously in relation to the quality or need 433 
of the signaller: (Grafen 1990, Godfray 1991, Johnstone & Grafen 1992, Pagel 1993). 434 
In each case, it is possible to explain why these models make different predictions to 435 
ours. As already discussed, in Johnstone & Grafen (1992) wide receiver variation 436 
causes different receivers to wish to respond to many different signallers in different 437 
ways, making variation in signalling level viable. In Grafen (1990) and Pagel (1993) 438 
this difference is due to the cost function, which they make an explicit function of the 439 
error in perception of underlying signaller quality, so that there is a cost which 440 
continuously increases as a function to the size of the perceptual error.  This is the 441 
situation we discussed in the introduction where all errors are considered to be costly. 442 
The exact mechanism underlying these costs is not defined in these papers, and 443 
choices available to the receivers (on receipt of a particular signal value) are not 444 
explicitly given. In Godfray (1991) the choices are explicitly given; these are the 445 
possible levels of provisioning by a parent to its offspring. This provisioning effort is 446 
considered to vary continuously, so there is a continuum of choices (rather than the 447 
binary choice considered here), and thus the scenario is different to ours, and (in the 448 
absence of perceptual errors) a continuously varying signal intensity is certainly 449 
plausible here.  450 
 451 
Notice that the receiver strategy as we have defined it only describes responses to the 452 
two types of signal that are expected in the equilibrium situation. There may be 453 
occasional aberrant individuals that produce signals that are different from either of 454 
the two signals that form the equilibrium. It is likely that the receivers will treat such a 455 
signal in a way similar to whichever of the two equilibrium signals it most resembles, 456 
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with the similarity of response getting stronger as the similarity between aberrant and 457 
nearest-equilibrium signals increases. Such generalization across similar signal types 458 
is commonly observed empirically (Bradbury & Vehrencamp 1998). However if 459 
signals just below the higher signalling level are always treated as the higher signal, 460 
the signalling system will be destabilized, so there must be at least some probability of 461 
such signals being treated as a low signal for any system to be stable (this would only 462 
need to be small for small discrepancies, since the benefit from using a lower-cost 463 
signal is greatly outweighed by the cost of being interpreted as a low signal). Overall, 464 
the optimal strategy for receivers to deal with aberrant signals will depend on the 465 
exact biological mechanism that leads to the production of aberrant signals, since the 466 
fine detail of this mechanism will influence the probability distribution of individual 467 
signaller qualities (q values) associated with a particular aberrant signal strength. 468 
However, we might not expect to see natural receivers closely following this 469 
theoretical optimum strategy, since aberrant signals will be rare and so selection 470 
pressure shaping responses to such signals will be less that selection on responses to 471 
more commonly encountered signals. Rather we might expect to find between-472 
receiver variation in response to aberrant signals (Arak & Enquist 1993), but with all 473 
receivers generally showing the rational behaviour of generalization across similar 474 
signals such that they treat aberrant signals (in particular high signals) in a way that is 475 
like their treatment of the most similar of the signals that makes up the equilibrium 476 
set.  477 
 478 
In this paper we have been particularly interested in how an honest signalling system 479 
could work in our chosen scenario, and this has been our main focus. However, we 480 
found that we could not discount the possibility of what we called a semi-honest 481 
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system, where higher signals mean a better quality individual than lower ones, but 482 
where the cut-off is not that of the totally honest signalling system. It may be that such 483 
systems can be destabilized through the introduction of signalling errors, as in 484 
Johnstone (1994), or alternatively through receiver variation, and this would certainly 485 
be worth further investigation. 486 
487 
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